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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1482 
___________ 
 
DARRELL PRINCE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
US GOVERNMENT; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT;  
SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES; US CONGRESS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-06702) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2017 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Darrell Prince appeals the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of 
his complaint for lack of standing.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.   
 The complaint is a mix of vague allegations concerning the recent election of 
President Donald Trump.  It principally alleges a flawed apportionment of Electoral 
College voters and federal representatives, in violation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and it additionally contends that President Trump’s financial holdings give 
him “unprecedented opportunities” to violate the Emoluments Clause.  Doc. No. 3 at 1-3.  
Filed in December 2016 (after the 2016 presidential election, but before Inauguration 
Day), the complaint sought “an immediate delay in the electoral college proceedings, 
until these matters can be worked out.”1  Doc. No. 3-1 at 1.   
 This Court exercises plenary review over district court orders dismissing a 
complaint for lack of standing.  N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 
369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015).  To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.  See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 
(2014); Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016).  Of these 
three required elements for standing, “the injury-in-fact element is often determinative.” 
                                              
1 Though some aspects of Prince’s suit may now be moot, we need not resolve this appeal 
on mootness grounds; standing is a similarly fundamental justiciability doctrine used to 
enforce the “constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
controversies.”  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quotations omitted).   
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Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted).  Here the injury-in-fact element is determinative. 
 For there to be an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must claim “the invasion of a concrete 
and particularized legally protected interest” resulting in harm “that is actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 
247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992)).  In this regard, “‘[the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently held that a plaintiff 
raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to 
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at 
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.’”  Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 
437, 439 (2007) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 499 (1975) (“[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in 
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally 
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).   
 We agree with the District Court that Prince lacks standing to bring this suit 
because he has suffered no injury particularized to him.  Indeed, we have already 
determined that individuals such as Prince lack standing to challenge a President’s 
eligibility to serve.  See Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
plaintiff pursuing a claim that President Barack Obama was ineligible to run for, and 
serve as, President of the United States, lacked standing because “his ‘interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws[]’” was shared with all voters; and that the 
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“relief he sought would have ‘no more directly tangibly benefit[ed] him than . . . the 
public at large.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74)).  Accordingly, the District Court 
did not err when it dismissed Prince’s complaint, and it did not abuse its discretion in 
doing so without leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
108 (3d Cir. 2002).  The motion for oral argument is denied. 
